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[En]gendering International Refugee Protection: Are We There Yet? 
 
Heaven Crawley 
 
 
This chapter takes stock of transnational developments in law and practice relating to gender 
asylum claims over the past twenty years in order to review the role of international human 
rights law (IHRL) in ‘gendering’ international refugee law (IRL) and the associated 
protection available to women asylum seekers. It has been argued that IRL has undergone an 
important transformation, catalysed by attention to women's issues in general, and 
particularly the development of what have been called new ‘gender asylum doctrines and 
procedures’.1 Proponents of this view identify three main areas of human rights abuse against 
women as illustrative of the ways in which IHRL has been successfully brought to bear in 
gender asylum claims, namely, rape and other forms of sexual violence, female genital 
mutilation (FGM) and family violence.   
 
This chapter argues that, whilst IHRL has the potential to reconfigure the relationship 
between gender and international refugee protection, it has not done so to date. This is partly 
because human rights law and discourse is itself gendered, privileging as it does ‘the family’ - 
often a source of intense and intimate violations of women’s human rights - as ‘the natural 
and fundamental group of society’. But it is also because IHRL has been brought to bear in 
gender asylum claims in ways that typically emphasise women as ‘victims’ of human rights 
violations rather than as holders of rights for whom access is negated by patriarchal 
institutions and structures. This framing of ‘women’ as ‘vulnerable victims’ of male violence 
not only creates a problematic hierarchy of oppressions but also ignores the ways in which 
gendered norms and power relations are politically and legally maintained.2 This, in turn, 
results in an ongoing and problematic emphasis in IRL on the issue of whether women are 
‘members of a particular social group’ (PSG).  This approach has increasingly been used to 
protect (sometimes narrowly defined) groups of women subject to certain kinds of 
persecution and harm to the neglect of a wider understanding of gendered power relations in 
countries of origin. 
 
1. The feminist critique of IRL  
 
The failure of the international community to acknowledge and protect asylum-seeking 
women from gender-specific and gender-related forms of persecution has been well 
documented.3 Although the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention) and its 1967 Protocol are ostensibly gender-neutral and do not distinguish 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Deborah Anker ‘Refugee law, gender, and the human rights paradigm’ (2002) 15 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal  133; Deborah Anker and Paul Lufkin ‘Gender and the symbiosis between refugee law 
and human rights law’ (2003) Migration Information Source  <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/gender-
and-symbiosis-between-refugee-law-and-human-rights-law> accessed 16 February 2005 
2 Heaven Crawley Refugees and Gender: Law and Process (Jordan Publishing 2001); Alice Edwards 
‘Transitioning gender: feminist engagement with international refugee law and policy, 1950-2010’ (2010) 29(2) 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 2; Jane Freedman ‘Women seeking asylum’ (2008) 10(2) International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 154; Nancy Oswin ‘Rights spaces: an exploration of feminist approaches to refugee law’ 
(2010) 3(3) International Feminist Journal of Politics 347. 
3 Ibid; and also Jacqueline Greatbach ‘The gender difference: feminist critiques of refugee discourse’ (1989) 
3(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 585; Audrey Macklin ‘Refugee women and the imperative of 
categories’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 213. 
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between male and female refugees,4 the dominant interpretation of refugee law has evolved 
through an examination of male asylum applicants and their activities. It is men who have 
been considered the principal agents of political resistance and therefore the legitimate 
beneficiaries of protection resulting from persecution.  
 
In this context, feminist jurisprudence has emerged as a systematic critique of the practice 
and profession of law, with its central theme that the law is a thoroughly gendered system 
that marginalizes women’s interests and reinforces male domination.5 It has been argued that, 
when gender becomes central to the analysis of IRL, the latter dissolves into a normative 
struggle whose outcome is determined largely by power.6 This normative structure both 
reflects and reinforces existing gender biases within States and allows issues of particular 
concern to women to be either ignored or undermined.  
 
In many respects, the failure to properly address the gender asylum claims of women is a 
product of a more general failure of IRL to recognise social and economic rights due to its 
emphasis instead on individual targeting and the deprivation of civil and political rights. This 
is despite the fact that social and economic rights may be violated for political reasons.7 
However, it is also related to a larger criticism of human rights law and discourse, namely 
that it privileges male-dominated ‘public’ activities over the activities of women, which take 
place largely in the so-called ‘private’ sphere. Modern international law, including IHRL 
and IRL, rests upon and reproduces various dichotomies between the public and private 
spheres: a distinction is made between matters of international ‘public’ concern and matters 
‘private’ to States that are considered within their domestic jurisdiction, and in which the 
international community has no recognised legal interest. Feminist legal scholars argue that 
such distinctions render gross violations of rights at the hands of individuals within the family 
and community largely invisible, such that what women do and what is done to them comes 
to be seen as irrelevant.8 Feminists have sought to mitigate this bias in the interpretation of 
the refugee definition by making women’s experiences of persecution in the ‘private’ sphere 
more visible. They have highlighted the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war, 
emphasised the particular structural dimensions that shape violence against women within the 
family and community, and drawn attention to oppressive cultural and ideological norms and 
practices that contribute to the harm experienced by women and which, they argue, should be 
identified as violations of women’s human rights.9  
 
                                                          
4 To the extent that gender is revealed in these legal texts, the masculine language used suggests that the male 
refugee was in the mind of the drafters. 
5 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright‘Feminist approaches to international law’ (2001) 
85 American Journal of International Law 614. 
6 Estel Strizhak and Catherine Harries Sex, Lies and International Law (Women’s Commission for Refugee 
Women and Children 1993). 
7 Gayle Binion, ‘Human rights: a feminist perspective’ (1985) 17(3) Human Rights Quarterly 509 
8 Patricia Campbell ‘Gendered human rights: the international community’s failed response to the persecution of 
women’ (2001) 29(1) Politics and Policy 121; Heaven Crawley ‘Women and refugee status; beyond the 
public/private dichotomy in UK asylum policy’ in Doreen Indra (ed.) Engendering Forced Migration: Theory 
and Practice (Berghahn Books 1999); Heaven Crawley ‘Engendering the state in refugee women’s claims for 
asylum’, in Susie Jacobs, Ruth Jacobson and Jenni Marchbank (eds) States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and 
Resistance (Zed Books 2000); Andrew Byrnes ‘Women, feminism and international human rights law – 
methodological myopia, fundamental flaws or meaningful marginalisation?’ (1992) Australian Year Book of 
International Law 205; Patricia Campbell ‘Gendered human rights: the international community’s failed 
response to the persecution of women’ (2001) 29(1) Politics and Policy 121. 
9 Oswin 2010 (n2). 
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This critique has explained the differential treatment of women in countries of origin and 
countries of asylum through analysis of both the gendered contexts within which their 
experiences of persecution occur and the gendered legal structures through which these 
experiences are subsequently interpreted. It has produced three significant contributions to 
the field of IRL: firstly, a sustained and well-documented position that human rights 
violations experienced or feared by women should be recognised as ‘serious harm’ rising to 
the level of ‘persecution’; secondly, the argument, increasingly tested through case law, that 
the mechanisms of IRL should look beyond the institution of the State and its direct action 
and to take a broader systematic look at both State action and inaction;10 and thirdly, the 
proposal that the grounds enumerated in the Refugee Convention should be interpreted to 
incorporate women’s experiences arising from gendered power relations rather than seeking 
to add a further ground (of ‘gender’ or ‘sex’). 
 
2. Bringing IHRL to bear on women’s claims for protection 
 
Following years of neglect of the needs of refugee and asylum-seeking women, a new 
awareness and willingness to take account of gender in policy development and 
implementation emerged from the mid-1980s onwards. This was given 
considerable impetus by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees’ (UNHCR) appointment in 1989 of its first Senior Coordinator for Refugee 
Women, whose remit it was to raise awareness of the particular issues facing refugee women 
and to develop training and policies in response. The history of how gender has come to be 
incorporated into the international refugee regime is outlined elsewhere and will not be 
reprised in detail here.11 However, it is important to acknowledge that, whilst the feminist 
critique of IRL played an important role in this process, it both arose from, and fed into, 
a broader critique of IHRL that sought to highlight the particular harms experienced by 
women in a range of contexts.  
 
As noted by Edwards, developments in international protection for women must be placed 
within a broader framework of advancements in IHRL including, in particular: the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
(1979)12 and its optional Protocol which were developed during the UN Decade on Women 
(1976-1985); the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1993)13 
together with the Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights that ‘women’s 
rights are human rights’; the Beijing Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth Conference on 
Women (1995);14 and jurisprudence arising from the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These developments provided the context within which it 
became possible for UNHCR and others to raise awareness about the particular harms 
experienced by asylum seeking women and the failures of the international refugee regime to 
provide surrogate protection.15 
 
                                                          
10 Campbell 2001 (n8). 
11 See, for example, Edwards 2010, Freedman 2008 (n2). 
12 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 
December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series 1249, 13 <www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3970.html> accessed 
16 February 2015 
13 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 20 December 
1993, A/RES/48/104 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f25d2c.html> accessed 16 February 2015 
14 United Nations, Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on 
Women, 27 October 1995 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dde04324.html> accessed 16 February 2015 
15 Edwards 2010 (n2). 
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Over the past twenty years, these advances in the field of IHRL, together with the 
campaigning and advocacy efforts of women’s organisations and refugee groups that 
highlight the experiences of women as asylum seekers, have resulted in important changes to 
policy and practice that have effectively served to legitimise the factual basis for gender 
asylum claims. In this respect, perhaps the most notable development has been the production 
of a number of national and international gender guidelines that specifically draw on IHRL to 
make claims concerning women’s right to protection under international refugee law, and 
which aim to assist decision-makers in understanding the importance of gender in policies 
and procedures for refugee status determination (RSD).  
 
In 2002, UNHCR issued guidance on the meaning of gender-related persecution that was 
intended to assist legal interpretation of the Refugee Convention by governments, legal 
practitioners, decision-makers and the judiciary, as well as by UNHCR staff carrying out 
RSD in the field.16 This guidance focused on promoting a gender-sensitive interpretation of 
the Convention and ensuring that RSD procedures would not marginalise or exclude gender-
related experiences of persecution. The guidance built on other UNHCR documents 
addressing discrete aspects of gender-related persecution, including a number of 
recommendations made by the Executive Committee dating back to 1985 and the Guidelines 
on the Protection of Refugee Women which were first produced in 1991.17  
 
Alongside these developments in the UN system there have been a number of initiatives on 
the part of individual States to draw the attention of decision-makers to the particular 
experiences of women seeking asylum. In 1993, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee 
Board issued its ground-breaking Guidelines on Refugee Women Claimants Fearing Gender-
Related Persecution, which were developed after extensive consultation with interested 
governmental and non-governmental groups and individuals. Two years later, the United 
States (US) Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) also issued Considerations for 
Asylum Officer Adjudicating Asylum Claims for Women. The US Gender Guidelines give 
specific instruction to decision-makers to recognise rape and other forms of sexual violence 
as persecution and also acknowledge that women who are beaten, tortured, or subject to such 
treatment for refusing to renounce their beliefs about the equal rights of women may be 
considered for international protection. Other gender guidelines were subsequently produced 
in Australia, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK).18 
 
It is important to note that UNHCR, practitioners, activists and others involved in the 
production of gender guidelines have consciously built the foundations of gender asylum law 
on the edifice of international women's human rights law and the work of the international 
women's human rights movement.19 For reasons that are as much strategic as principled, they 
have argued that, in order to respond to women's experiences of persecution, refugee law 
needs to evolve through a process of interpretation that draws on the framework of IHRL, 
rather than be amended to incorporate new gender-specific provisions. The US Gender 
Guidelines, for example, specifically instruct that gender asylum claims ‘must be viewed 
within the framework provided by existing international human rights instruments and the 
                                                          
16 The development of these gender guidelines by UNHCR is documented elsewhere (Edwards 2010; Freedman 
2008 (n2)). 
17 Heaven Crawley and Trine Lester Comparative Analysis of Gender-Related Persecution in National Asylum 
Legislation and Practice in Europe Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit Evaluation Report EPAU/2004/05 
(UNHCR 2004). 
18 See further below. 
19 Anker 2002, Anker and Lufkin 2003 (n1). 
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interpretation of these instruments by international organisations’, whether or not the United 
States has ratified them.20  
 
Similarly, in the UK, the Refugee Women’s Legal Group (RWLG), which was established in 
1996 by feminist lawyers, practitioners and academics concerned about the impact of changes 
in immigration law on women seeking asylum, consciously emphasised IHRL in the 
production its Gender Guidelines for Asylum Claims in the UK.21 The RWLG guidelines, 
which form the basis of guidance subsequently issued by the Immigration Appellate 
Authority (IAA) in 2000 and by the Home Office in 2004, draw on Hathaway’s framework 
within which persecution is defined as ‘the sustained or systematic violation of basic human 
rights demonstrative of a failure of State protection in relation to one of the core entitlements 
which have been recognised by the international community’.22  
 
According to the RWLG guidelines, a decision about whether an instance of harm, including 
harm which is gender-specific, amounts to persecution should be assessed on the basis of 
these internationally recognised human rights standards. A list of international human 
instruments which may be useful tools in interpreting the Refugee Convention is also 
provided.23 This principle is reflected in the asylum policy instructions issued to initial 
decision-makers by the Home Office in 2004 and periodically updated.24 For example, the 
most recent version states that: 
 
In addition to the UK’s obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the minimum standards for 
protection set by the EU Qualification Directive, there are international and national 
legal instruments which impose positive duties on the UK to eliminate discrimination 
and gender-based violence; these include for example the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) ratified by the 
UK in 1986, the ECHR as implemented by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Gender 
Equality Duty introduced into the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 by the Equality Act 
2006.25 
 
                                                          
20 See Karen Musalo ‘A short history of gender asylum in the United States: resistance and ambivalence may 
very slowly be inching towards recognition of women’s asylum claim’ (2010) 29(2) Refugee Survey Quarterly 
46. 
21 Refugee Women’s Legal Group (RWLG) Gender Guidelines for the Determination of Asylum Claims in the 
UK (ILPA 1998) <www.ilpa.org.uk/data/resources/4112/genderguidelines.pdf> accessed 16 February 2015 
22 James Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworth 1991) 112. 
23 RWLG 1998 (n20), paragraph 1.20. The list of human rights instruments to which the guidelines refers 
includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948), the 1926 Slavery Convention and 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar 
to Slavery of 1956, the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War and the two Additional Protocols of 
1977, the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of Prostitution of Others 
(1949), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950), the Convention on the Consent to 
Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962), the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
(1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966), the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979), the UN Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) (1984), the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC) (1989), the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women (1993) and the UN Platform for Action (1995). 
24 Home Office Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim (Home Office 2010). 
25 ibid. paragraph 1.1. 
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The Australian gender guidelines similarly acknowledge the importance of interpreting 
gender asylum claims within the context of the international human rights framework for 
protection.26  
 
3. ‘Women’s rights as human rights’ in the context of RSD  
 
IHRL has been brought to bear directly on IRL principally through the production of gender 
guidelines within the UN system and in national jurisdictions that are intended to bring a 
gendered perspective to the determination of gender asylum claims within RSD systems. 
These guidelines have been a major vehicle for the articulation and acceptance of the human 
rights paradigm and have resulted in the development of case law which has delivered greater 
protection for women fleeing gender-related persecution in certain contexts and 
circumstances.27 The relevant literature highlights three areas in this regard, namely rape and 
sexual violence, female genital mutilation (FGM) and domestic or familial violence.28 
 
3.1 Rape and sexual violence 
 
Over the last twenty years, there has been increased awareness of the use of sexual violence 
not only as a weapon of war but also as a gender-specific form of harm inflicted on women 
(and men) in the context of political repression and unrest.29 Sexual violence is a major and 
increasingly well-documented factor in forced migration, with serious physical, social and 
psychological consequences. Although such violence should be one of the least controversial 
examples of ‘serious harm’ in the context of a definition of persecution, the interpretation of 
sexual violence against women has often differed substantially from the interpretation of 
other forms of serious harm experienced by men due to the fact that in the past ‘some 
decision-makers have proven unable to grasp the nature of rape by State actors as an integral 
and tactical part of the arsenal of weapons deployed to brutalise, dehumanise, and humiliate 
women and demoralise their kin and community’.30  
 
As noted by Anker and Lufkin, prior to the introduction of gender guidelines, even cases of 
rape and sexual violence that might otherwise have been considered to fit the traditional 
paradigms of refugee law were routinely dismissed in US and Canadian case law as ‘private’. 
For example, when a Salvadoran woman whose family was active in a cooperative movement 
was raped by death squads while they shouted political slogans and hacked her male relatives 
to death, she was deemed the victim of private violence. Similarly, a US immigration judge 
denied asylum to a Haitian woman who was gang-raped because of her support for the 
deposed president, though the ruling was eventually overturned.  
 
Anker and Lufkin argue that the articulation of the human rights paradigm within IRL has led 
to increased awareness of the politically-motived uses of rape and sexual violence and a 
greater willingness on the part of decision-makers to acknowledge its consequences for those 
seeking asylum.31 They show that this has begun to have some impact on case law. For 
example, Canadian tribunals have expressly held that rape or threats of rape ‘are degrading 
                                                          
26 Susan Kneebone ‘Women within the refugee construct: ‘exclusionary inclusion’ in policy and practice- the 
Australian experience’ (2005) 17(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 7. 
27 Anker 2002, Anker and Lufkin 2003 (n1). 
28 ibid. 
29 Edwards 2010, Oswin 2010 (n2). 
30 Macklin 1995 (n3). 
31 Anker and Lufkin (2003) (n1) 
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and constitute quite clearly an attack on the moral integrity of the person, and hence, 
persecution of the most vile sort’, a phrase which echoes the description of rape in the 
Canadian gender guidelines. 
 
3.2 Female genital mutilation (FGM) 
 
There is also a growing (but still relatively small) body of law that recognises FGM as the 
basis for a refugee claim, much of which locates the harm feared within a human rights 
framework.32 The first country in the world to grant asylum because of FGM was Canada in 
1994. In this case, Farah,33 a woman fearing FGM if returned to Somalia was found to fear 
persecution due to her membership in ‘two social groups, namely women and minors’. 
Gender was determined to be an innate and unchangeable characteristic. The authorities held 
that FGM violated numerous provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), including the 
right to life and the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.34  
 
In the US, the oft-cited Matter of Kasinga35 was filed in the mid-1990s when the campaign 
for ‘women’s rights as human rights’ was in full swing and gender-based violence took centre 
stage as the focal point of efforts to change policy and practice in cases involving violence 
against women.36 In this case, a 19 year old woman who fled Togo to avoid FGM was 
granted asylum by the US Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative 
tribunal in the US immigration system at that time. The Board found that FGM is severe 
enough to constitute persecution and applied the holding of its seminal social group decision 
Matter of Acosta37 to find that she was the member of a social group defined by gender in 
combination with other immutable and fundamental characteristics.38 Musalo outlines the 
reasoning of the Board in some detail and notes that the decision implicitly overcame the 
interpretive barriers which had stood previously in the way of many gender asylum claims.39  
 
More recently, in the UK case of Fornah,40 the House of Lords accepted that a woman who 
feared return to Sierra Leone because she would face gender-specific persecution in the form 
of FGM was entitled to recognition as a refugee because she feared persecution on account of 
her membership of a particular social group. Her appeal was allowed on the basis that women 
in Sierra Leone and, alternatively, uninitiated women who had not been subjected to FGM in 
Sierra Leone, were particular social groups. The Home Office had previously accepted that 
FGM constitutes cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
 
3.3 Domestic and familial violence 
 
Finally, Anker and Lufkin highlight an emerging body of case law that addresses violence 
against women in the context of the family and community, suggesting that there have been 
                                                          
32 Oswin 2010 (n2). 
33 Farah v Canada (MEI) (1994) 3 July. 
34 Anker and Lufkin (2003) (n1). 
35 In Re Kasinga Int Dec 3278 (BIA 1996) 
36 Sara McKinnon ‘Positioned in/by the State: incorporation, exclusion, and appropriation of women’s gender-
based claims to political asylum in the United States’ (2011) 97(2) Quarterly Journal of Speech 178-200 
37 Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985)  
38 Musalo 2010 (n19). 
39 ibid 
40 Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46. 
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shifts towards accepting violence within the family as persecution under IRL which again 
draw upon the principles embedded in IHRL.41  
 
The problem of violence against women in the family, commonly referred to as ‘domestic’ 
violence, is enormous and multifaceted. Violence within the family, which is often supported 
or condoned by the wider community, includes physical, sexual and psychological abuse 
inside and outside the home. It is deeply intertwined with prejudices concerning women as 
inferior, as the property of their male relatives (husband, fathers, uncles, male siblings) and 
requiring women to be obedient and to sacrifice their needs to service men. In some contexts, 
it takes a specific form such as the so-called ‘honour killing’, dowry death or bride-burning 
and the custom of sati. All of these acts are manifestations of the prevalence of violence 
against women by family members and reflect varying degrees of tolerance of such violence 
by the State. They have typically been viewed with considerable scepticism with the refugee 
determination process. 42 
 
Until the mid-1990s there was no little or discussion about whether women experiencing 
violence within the family and community were entitled to protection under international 
refugee law. However, just as campaigning efforts to challenge the privatisation of sexual 
violence have gone some way towards bringing cases within the scope of international 
protection, so too the feminist challenge to IHRL has resulted in an increased emphasis on the 
ways in which violence within the family can form the basis of a claim for asylum or may 
interrelate with other forms of persecution to explain the harm which a woman fears. This is 
particularly clear in cases involving gendered social mores and the concept of honour, where 
members of a woman’s family and/or community are commonly responsible for punishing 
women who fail or refuse to conform.  
 
This scenario can be seen in the British case of Shah and Islam,43 where the House of Lords 
held that the State could be held responsible for private or domestic abuse where such 
violence was either tolerated or condoned. Similarly, in Australia, the High Court addressed 
issues of persecutory intent and State action in the case of Khawar, which involved a woman 
from Pakistan who was subject to systematic abuse at the hands of her husband and had tried 
and failed to obtain police protection on several occasions.44 According to McPherson and 
others, this case destabilised prevalent protection discourses that understand domestic 
violence as a ‘private matter’ between individuals.45  
 
Meanwhile in considering a case of severe domestic violence in Iran, Re MN, the New 
Zealand Refugee Status Appeal Authority concluded that a policy of gender discrimination 
and the enforcement of gender-based norms against women as a group in Iran was such as to 
permit a finding of persecution in the sense of a sustained or systemic violation of basic 
human rights.46 The Authority went further still in Refugee Appeal No. 76044, which 
addressed honour killings in Turkey, by acknowledging that women can challenge prevailing 
power structures in a variety of ways, for example, by refusing an arranged marriage, ending 
                                                          
41 Anker and Lufkin (2003) (n1). 
42 Crawley 2001 (n2). 
43 Islam v SSHD; R v IAT ex parte Shah [1999] INLR 144, Imm AR 293 (HL). 
44 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar [2002] 187 ALR 574; 210 CLR 1 
45 Melanie McPherson, Leah S Horowitz, Dean Lusher, Sarah di Giglio, Lucy E Greenacre and Yuri B 
Saalmann ‘Marginal women, marginal rights: impediments to gender-based persecution claims by asylum-
seeking women in Australia’ (2011) 21(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 323. 
46 Re MN Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93 (1996) 
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a violent marriage, refusing to dress or behave in accordance with socially defined roles and 
mores - and if they suffer harm as a result, the broader definition of ‘political belief’ could 
result in their recognition as refugees under the Refugee Convention.47 
 
4. One step forward, two steps back… 
 
Anker and Lufkin suggest that the fact that IRL has identified key forms of violence against 
women as core violations of their human rights is a significant aspect of its success in 
addressing gender asylum claims: 
 
It [refugee law] has been able to do so by applying a human rights paradigm and 
building on the work of the international human rights community. Making the 
relationship between refugee law and human rights law explicit creates opportunities 
for advances within both fields.48 
 
Certainly, it is important to recognise these legal advances and to draw upon them where 
possible and appropriate to promote protection for women under IRL. Yet it is also crucial to 
acknowledge a significant, and growing, concern among feminist legal scholars that the gains 
made in relation to gender asylum claims over the past twenty years have been more limited 
than was anticipated. Developing this critique, the remainder of the chapter will suggest that, 
whilst IHRL has the potential to reconfigure the relationship between gender and 
international refugee protection, as Anker and Lufkin suggest, it has not done so to date and 
in fact may reinforce gender stereotypes that are ultimately unhelpful to women (and men) 
seeking international protection. The reasons for this are complex and inter-related.  
 
4.1 Implementation gap  
 
The treatment of gender asylum claims in law and practice cannot be seen outside the context 
of broader shifts in attitudes and policies concerning asylum-seeking.49 There has been 
growing political concern across refugee-receiving States since the late 1990s about the scale 
of asylum flows and their composition, resulting in a series of legislative and policy changes 
to tighten access to procedures for RSD. These changes have been associated with the 
externalisation of border controls, increasingly restrictive entry procedures, the use of 
detention, dispersal and deportation to reduce the number of applications and control those 
who arrive, and restrictions in the availability of welfare to support asylum seekers whilst 
they await a decision about their future. Freedman suggests that reducing the numbers to 
whom refugee status is granted is an important part of this process.50 This view is shared by 
Mullally, who maintains that the process of asylum adjudication in the US is tainted by 
immigration concerns that may become particularly accentuated in gender-based claims. This 
is due to the scale of patriarchal violence experienced by women globally, as well as concerns 
about ‘opening the floodgates’ to potentially huge numbers of people seeking international 
protection.51 
 
                                                          
47 Refugee Appeal No. 76044 [2008] New Zealand: Refugee Status Appeals Authority 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/48d8a5832.html> accessed 16 February 2015 
48 Anker and Lufkin 2003 (n1), emphasis added. 
49 Freedman 2008 (n2); Crawley and Lester 2004 (n17); Kneebone 2005 (n25). 
50 Freedman 2008 (n2). 
51 Siobhan Mullally ‘Domestic violence asylum claims and recent development in international human rights 
law: a progress narrative?’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 459. 
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One of the consequences of this increasingly restrictive context is the existence of an 
‘implementation gap’ in practice across the countries in which gender guidelines have been 
developed and introduced.52 In other words, the introduction of gender guidelines does not 
mean that gender has been ‘taken care of’. In Australia, conscious and consistent regard for 
gender-based claims is not yet evident.53 Similarly, across the countries of Europe, there has 
been limited progress towards ensuring gender-sensitive asylum procedures or interpretation 
of the Refugee Convention. For instance, none of the 41 countries surveyed by Crawley and 
Lester in 2004 had officially adopted the UNHCR Gender Guidelines into their legislation or 
policy.54 Just two countries had introduced their own guidance on the assessment of gender-
related asylum claims, although a further eight had included some gender-related points 
within their general RSD policy or guidelines. Where progress had been made at the policy 
level, implementation was found to be inconsistent. One key example of this uneven progress 
is that authorities in less than half of the countries surveyed had explicitly recognised that 
sexual violence can be a form of persecution.  
 
A more recent report on nine countries in Europe has also found significant inconsistencies in 
the interpretation of gender-based claims for protection despite the existence of European 
legislation including the Qualification Directive.55 In the case of France, for instance, it has 
been observed that ‘discretionary power is exercised through gendered lenses that ignore the 
complexity of the experiences of women seeking asylum and instead reduces them to a series 
of stereotyped roles’.56 This is made possible, in part, because of the number and range of 
agencies and individuals involved in the process. Whilst this problem is not unique to gender 
asylum claims, it seems likely to have been exacerbated by the very significant differences 
that exist in the incorporation of international directives and policies into national contexts. 
 
4.2 Persistence of patriarchal norms 
 
Barriers to gender asylum claims arise not just from administrative and procedural 
inconsistencies in RSD but from the patriarchal nature of international law itself. As noted at 
the beginning of this chapter, international law is a thoroughly gendered system.57 As such, 
IRL constantly reconstructs and reconstitutes itself to maintain the (masculine) status quo. 
This process can be seen particularly clearly in gender asylum claims that challenge the 
gendered construction of the public/private dichotomy, including the Matter of Kasinga 
decision discussed above.58 Although the case elicited considerable enthusiasm from refugee 
activists and scholars, who hoped that it would expand protection for women seeking asylum, 
others were critical of the fact-specific explanation and questioned its potential impact on 
future gender asylum cases. This has indeed proved to be the case.  
 
The principles established in the Matter of Kasinga were brought into question by the BIA 
just three years later in the now well-documented Matter of RA.59 This case concerned a 
Guatemalan woman, Rody Alvarado, who fled Guatemala in 1995 after suffering years of 
physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her husband who raped her repeatedly, beating her 
                                                          
52 Edwards 2010 (n2); Musalo 2010 (n19); McPherson et al. 2011 (n42). 
53 McPherson et al. 2011 (n42). 
54 Crawley and Lester 2004 (n17). 
55 European Parliament Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe (Brussels 2012).  
56 Freedman 2008 (n2) 155. 
57 Charlesworth et al. 1991 (n3) 614-5. 
58 In Re Kasinga (n33). 
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before and after, kicked her genitalia, causing her to bleed for eight days, forcefully 
sodomized her, pistol-whipped her and violently kicked her in the spine when she refused to 
abort their foetus.60 When she protested, he often responded, ‘you’re my woman, you do what 
I say’ or ‘I can do it if I want to’.61 Despite her request for assistance the Guatemalan police 
would not, or could not, help her. On three occasions her husband was summoned by the 
authorities, but he failed to appear and the police took no further action. Twice the police did 
not respond at all to her calls for help, and a judge told Rody Alvarado that he would not 
intervene in domestic disputes. Her husband insisted that calling the police was futile because 
of his connections with them through military service. Rody Alvarado knew of no shelters or 
organizations that could help her, so she fled to the United States and sought asylum.  
 
An Immigration Judge in the US found Rody Alvarado’s account credible and granted her 
asylum. However, the government successfully appealed the decision to the BIA, which held 
that, even though she had sustained serious injuries at the hands of her husband, she had 
failed to establish that the harm she suffered was on account of either membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. The BIA held that both the ‘social visibility’ and 
‘particularity’ of the social group must be established in order to secure protection under IRL, 
thereby distancing itself from the earlier ruling in Kasinga by largely rejecting the relevance 
of the social context in determining nexus.  
 
The decision in Matter of RA led to a long legal battle to vindicate the principle that women’s 
rights are human rights, which was only brought to a conclusion ten years later in December 
2009 when Rody Alvarado was finally granted asylum. Yet the case illustrates the problem 
that continues to face victims of violence within the family and community: it is regarded as a 
‘private’ matter for which the State bears no responsibility, even where it has failed to protect 
the individual from serious harm rising to the level of persecution.62 The decision was widely 
criticised not least because of the negative implications that it had for a whole range of 
gender asylum cases involving persecution committed in the context of State impunity. There 
is no shortage of cases in the US and elsewhere in which either the lack of an enumerated 
ground and/or a lack of State connection serves to undermine the application based on family 
and community violence and thereby leads to a refusal.63  
 
Thus, whilst there have been some significant developments in IHRL relating to family 
violence, there remains inconsistency and ambivalence in terms of the way these cases are 
treated in asylum adjudication. Reflecting this, Mullally argues that refugee law is simply not 
keeping pace with the inclusion of domestic violence in the panoply of rights and positive 
obligations now recognised in IHRL:  
 
Most notable in the case law on domestic violence in asylum cases is the limited 
reference to recent developments in international human rights standards on domestic 
                                                          
60 Allison W Reimann ‘Hope for the future? The asylum claims of women fleeing sexual violence in Guatemala’ 
(2009) 157(4) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1199; M S Cianciarulo ‘Batterers as agents of the State: 
challenging the public / private distinction in intimate partner violence-based asylum claim’ (2012) 35 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Gender117; Musalo 2010 (n19); Mullally 2011 (n48). 
61 Reimann 2009 (n57). 
62 Jenny-Brooke Condon ‘Asylum law’s gender paradox’ (2003) 33(1) Seton Hall Law Review; Cianciarulo 
2012 (n57). 
63 S Zeigler and KB Stewart Positioning women’s rights within asylum policy: a feminist analysis of political 
persecution’ (2009) 30(2) Frontiers: A Journal of Women’s Studies 115. 
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violence, and the standard of due diligence in particular. The worlds of refugee and 
human rights law continue to remain apart.64  
 
This problem is not limited to cases involving familial and community violence. There also 
appears to be a rising bar for establishing persecution in US asylum cases involving sexual 
and reproductive harm.65 Analysing recent cases in the US, Marouf argues that adjudicators 
tend to apply a higher standard for physical harm in these types of cases and largely overlook 
non-physical harm including psychological harm and harm caused by deprivation of equality, 
autonomy and privacy. She notes particular patterns in cases involving FGM and the 
involuntary insertion of IUDs. The European Parliament has similarly noted that, despite 
legal precedents in some countries, not all States recognise FGM as a form of violence 
constituting persecution. For example, authorities in France, Malta and Romania do not 
always accept that FGM can amount to persecution and in Belgium asylum claims based on 
fear of FGM are reliant on an invasive annual medical examination.66  
 
Meanwhile, a recent comprehensive examination by Millbank and Dauvergne in Australia, 
Canada, the United States and the UK of cases based on forced marriage reveals what the 
authors describe as a ‘profound schism between human rights norms and refugee law’s 
protection’.67 The choice of whether, and when, to marry has been acknowledged in several 
key international instruments including the UDHR, ICCPR and CEDAW as a fundamental 
human right and in this context it might be expected that the issue of forced marriage would 
find a direct fit in the framework of IRL. In reality this is not the case. Rather their study of 
forced marriage ‘demonstrates a stark disjuncture between refugee jurisprudence and human 
rights jurisprudence.68Although forced marriage is explicitly acknowledged as a gender-
related form of persecution in many of the national and international refugee law documents 
outlined earlier in this chapter, including the Canadian, Australian and UK guidelines, in 
practice those making asylum claims on this basis struggle to articulate the harm of forced 
marriage and to establish a nexus between the harm feared and an enumerated Convention 
ground. 
 
4.3 Gendered nature of IHRL 
 
It was noted earlier in this chapter that the feminist critique that gained momentum in the 
early 1980s was not directed exclusively towards IRL but rather at international law more 
generally, including IHRL. The relationship between IHRL and women’s rights has long 
been the subject of debate and has raised fundamental questions about the processes by which 
human rights are defined, adjudicated and enforced, as well as questions about the substance 
of what is thereby ‘protected’.69 Byrnes, for example, accuses the mainstream human rights 
community and Human Rights Committee of all too often demonstrating gender blindness in 
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relation to a range of issues including issues of privacy,70 the right to bodily integrity and the 
right of a person to fair and non-discriminatory treatment by the legal system. The Human 
Rights Committee, he argues, is not atypical but reflects a wider lack of importance given to 
issues of gender:  
 
…by and large there is relatively little acknowledgment that gender is an important 
dimension in defining the substantive content of rights, in particular those rights that do 
not refer specifically to women or that embody a guarantee of non-discrimination.71 
 
Writing in the early 1990s, feminist legal scholars argued that the marginalization of 
women’s human rights was a function, in significant part, of IHRL’s focus on direct State 
violations of individual rights which in turn embodies an acceptance of the division between 
the public and private spheres, a point made earlier in this chapter.  
 
The relevant point here is that this situation has not changed in the intervening period: 
patriarchy prevails within both the content and structures of IHRL. Edwards gives the 
example of the torture prohibition which is still mainly applied and understood in the context 
of physical ill-treatment perpetrated by State or quasi-State officials against political 
dissidents or prisoners for the purpose of extracting information or forcing an individual the 
confess. But the public / private distinction can also be seen clearly in the conceptualization 
within IHRL of the patriarchal institutions – religion, family and the State itself – on which 
so many nations depend.72  
 
Article 16.3 of the UDHR, for example, proclaims that ‘the family is the natural and 
fundamental group of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State’. Yet it is 
clear not only that women may be targeted by the State (and others) because of their 
relationships within the family (for example, in order to ‘get at’ political active fathers, sons 
and spouses or in order to regulate reproduction), but that the family can be the location of 
intense violations of a woman’s human rights. To this extent, the description of the family as 
either ‘public’ or ‘private is misleading and simplistic: it is more accurately described as a 
collective unit which mirrors other power structures in society.73 Regardless, this construction 
of violence within the family as ‘private’ and beyond the scope of IRL can be seen in cases 
involving so-called domestic violence, even where violence clearly rises to the level of 
persecution and where no State protection is available.  
 
Others argue that IRL has not simply been interpreted and understood in ways that ignore or 
marginalize women’s rights but has actually served to (re)produce the idea that the privileged 
status of men vis-à-vis women is somehow natural.74 In other words, that an asymmetrical 
approach to sex discrimination is firmly cemented within the UN institutional framework and 
by extension the framework, institutions and systems of IHRL. According to Otto, ‘women 
were invariably reproduced by international law as the dependents, property or extensions of 
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men and therefore in need of legal ‘protection’ rather than legal ‘rights’.75 She argues that 
international humanitarian law, international labour law and early treaties prohibiting 
trafficking in women for the purposes of prostitution all portrayed women as vulnerable and 
familial by nature, whilst men were portrayed as protectors, supporters and saviours. This 
hierarchical scheme ‘took women’s inferiority to men as a given, and legitimated treating 
them protectively, rather than as bearers of rights’.76 A similar point is made by Oxford, who 
argues that the fundamental problem with incorporating women’s human rights into an 
existing human rights framework is that theories, laws and ideas of what constitutes human 
rights follow an androcentric model. In other words, men’s experiences provide the 
framework for human rights and the baseline against which women’s experiences are 
assessed and ultimately judged.77  
 
According to a growing body of feminist scholarship, therefore, IHRL is based on an 
androcentric ‘male-as-norm’ model which privileges the family - often a source of intense 
and intimate violations of women’s human rights - as ‘the natural and fundamental group of 
society’. Edwards argues that, regardless of the efforts undertaken by feminists and others 
over the past two decades to make the case that human rights are women’s right, the reality is 
that human rights are, to a significant extent, men’s rights in the sense that the main treaties 
of IHRL contain norms that are predominantly applicable to men’s experiences and are 
focused around the fears of men rather than those of women. Women, she suggests, are still 
not yet full citizens for the purpose of benefiting from the protection available under IHRL. 
Men, it is suggested, are the standard of IHRL and if women are to be included at all they are 
seen as a deviation from that standard, as a ‘special case’. As a consequence, even if IHRL is 
brought to bear on IRL, women claiming protection must ‘fit’ their experience of violence 
into male-defined criteria, which in turn reflects a system that treats women unequally.78  
 
4.4 Depoliticisation of gender 
 
This understanding of IHRL as inherently gendered goes some way to explaining its failure to 
fully reconfigure the relationship between gender and international refugee protection. But 
there is a second, even more important, but closely related, explanation that stems from the 
first: namely that women have come to be incorporated within IRL as ‘victims’ of human 
rights violations rather than as holders of rights whose experiences of persecution can only be 
fully grasped by understanding the gendered nature of rights available to women in specific 
geographical contexts.  
 
There are several different aspects to this problem. The first is the tendency to equate gender 
with ‘sex’ which prevails within human rights theory and advocacy, including that directed 
specifically towards international refugee law.79 The term term ‘gender’ refers to the social 
construction of power relations between women and men, and the implications of these 
relations for women’s (and men’s) identity, status, roles and responsibilities.80 Gender 
relations and gender differences are historically-, geographically- and culturally-specific, so 
that what it is to be a ‘woman’ or ‘man’ varies through space and over time. As 
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Charlesworth notes, despite the emancipatory possibilities opened up by the language of 
gender (for both women and men), it remains common for feminists and those advocating for 
women’s rights to use gender as a synonym for ‘women’ which undermines the idea that 
gender is a social and relational category and threatens to reduce women, once again, to 
biology.81  
 
This process of decontextualizing women’s experiences has been reinforced by the well-
meaning but ultimately unhelpful tendency within IRL to represent ‘women’ as victims of 
male violence rather than holders of rights whose access to rights has been negated or 
undermined by patriarchal structures and institutions. In the area of refugee law and policy, 
unequal power relations abound. Yet those advocating for a more gender-inclusive 
application of IRL have (intentionally or otherwise) often reinforced and exacerbated 
gendered stereotypes. As this author has argued previously,82 one unintended but very 
serious effect of merely adding ‘women’ to existing analyses without an understanding of 
the differences between women arising from context is that they appear only as victims: 
refugee women are presented as uniformly poor, powerless and vulnerable victims of, for 
example, ‘male oppression’ or ‘oppressive cultures, religions or traditions’, while Western 
women are the reference point for modern, educated, sexually-liberated womanhood.  
 
Building on this theme, Johnson explores the gender narrative of refugee representation by 
the UNHCR and how it intersects with political (non-) agency.83 She argues that how we 
imagine particular categories of people determines how we engage with them, who we 
accept, who is able to participate and on what terms. Johnson notes that, whilst women are 
increasingly included in refugee regimes through policies, guidelines and other initiatives, 
they are included as a broad and undifferentiated category of victims, lacking agency and 
unable to determine their own futures. This positioning of women has played an important 
role in the discourses of victimisation and depoliticisation employed by UNHCR to reduce 
the threat perception of the refugees and generate support for a politics of humanitarianism. 
Kneebone similarly argues that Refugee Women are generalised into a category that is both 
dependent and in need of protection. Whilst this construction of the vulnerable Refugee 
Woman is useful as a tool for the mobilisation of support behind humanitarian intervention 
and refugee work, it reproduces and reinforces the idea that women from the global South are 
powerless and lack agency.84 Others go further still, pointing out that the amalgamation of 
‘women-and-children’ into one category of ‘vulnerable’ refugees has major impacts on the 
way in which gender is treated in issues of refugee protection.85  
 
There is growing evidence, therefore, that the focus on women’s human rights has become 
counter-productive because it reinforces the naturalized moorings of sex/gender and supports 
concomitant conceptions of women (and men) that justify protective and imperial, rather than 
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rights-based, responses to women’s human rights violations.86 The emphasis is firmly on 
women’s victimhood and the correlate stereotyping of ‘women’ as passive victims, as objects 
rather than subjects of law. According to Edwards, feminist scholarship and activism can be 
criticised for feeding this essentialisation of women as victims of ‘private’ male violence. She 
and others argue that the attention on violence against women, particularly sexual violence 
and ‘exotic’ forms of harm, feeds into the stereotyping of both women and men. In this 
construction ‘Third World Women’ are constructed as ‘victims’ or ‘others’ in need of 
‘saving’.87  
 
At the same time there is emerging evidence that race and gender come together in particular 
ways to legitimate the protection of women fleeing certain types of harms and simultaneously 
exclude others.   On the one hand certain types of harm, most notably domestic violence, are 
viewed by judges as being universal and therefore outwith the protection potentially available 
to women under IRL. On the other hand, a racialized series of exotic assumptions are 
articulated in relation to violence only or mostly experienced by ‘other’ women, most notably 
FGM and honour killings. Drawing on the work of Spivak,88 Oxford suggests that these 
assumptions play out in scepticism about whether women should be protected against 
domestic violence because of the fear that ‘everyone will want to come’, whilst conversely 
there is a prime facie case where the harm feared is perceived to be ‘exotic’, signifying a 
cultural backwardness from which ‘other’ women can be rescued.89  Whilst this may provide 
access to protection for some women who can legitimately be rescued from ‘other’ men and 
cultures, it can have exclusionary rather than inclusionary effects for those whose experiences 
are not consistent with this racialized narrative and instead require receiving countries to look 
inwardly at gendered power relations within their own societies. .90  
 
4.5 Problem of ‘exclusionary inclusion’ 
 
The concept of ‘exclusionary inclusion’ was developed by Susan Kneebone in an attempt to 
explain, and make sense of, the ongoing difficulties experienced by women in securing 
protection under IRL against violations of their human rights.91 Writing with reference to the 
Australian context, Kneebone suggests that a major problem with the current dominant 
approach to gender asylum claims is that it constructs the Refugee Woman according to her 
vulnerability in a patriarchal society in which women are subordinate to men as victims, or 
potential victims, of sexual or other violence directed towards them as women. Kneebone, 
together with a growing number of feminist legal scholars, has argued that one of the 
consequences of this construction is that women and their experiences are incorporated into 
the refugee regime in a particular gendered way which serves ultimately to undermine the 
protection available to them.92  
 
Indeed, this is reflected in evidence that the trend towards ‘protective’ responses that assume 
women’s vulnerability, dependency and need for ‘special protections’ has led to an over-
emphasis on the construction of ‘women’ or specific groups of women as members of a 
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‘particular social group’ (PSG). There has been considerable debate and legal argument over 
the past twenty years about whether or not ‘women’, or groups of women (variously 
conceived), are deserving of protection on this basis and several positive developments in 
case law in Canada, the US, Australia and the UK were noted earlier in this chapter. As a 
consequence, membership of a PSG has now become the default ground for women’s claims 
in many jurisdictions, even when one or more of the other grounds may be equally or more 
relevant.93 Many of these cases are not legally binding or are factually-specifically and are of 
limited precedent value for other gender asylum claims. Moreover an understanding of 
gendered power relations in countries of origin is often absent.  As a result, the experiences of 
women are often framed in ways that are confusing, contradictory and can actually serve to 
undermine the real case for protection.94  
 
The successful construction of women as belonging in a particular social group in any given 
geographical context will depend on the prevailing narratives about women in general, about 
their countries of origin, and about the particular forms of violence they claim to have 
experienced (or fear).95 As Mullally suggests, the risk of essentialising the position of women 
in a particular society runs through many gendered claims to asylum and this is particularly 
evident where women are constructed within the parameters of membership of a PSG. In 
these cases, women are constructed as the ‘victim’ subject, with limited attention paid to the 
historical, economic and other lines of difference that shape and define experience of gender 
discrimination and which fragment the category of ‘women’.96  
 
In practice, therefore, applications framing women’s experiences as members of a PSG often 
reflect a particularly static conception of gender that rests on, and ultimately replicates, the 
existing and paradigmatically masculine normative structures of IRL, strengthening the view 
of women as social and cultural actors but not political ones and ignoring the political (with a 
small ‘p’) context within which violence against women occurs.97 This problem often arises 
from the (over)emphasis in RSD on the particular harms experienced by women and the 
associated failure to explore fully the principle of non-discrimination, the violation of which 
frequently provides an explanation for the reasons why such harms take place and therefore 
provide a nexus to one of the other enumerated Convention grounds.  
 
5. So, are we there yet? 
 
There have been some significant developments in IRL over the last twenty years which can 
be attributed, at least in part, to the efforts of refugee scholars, lawyers and practitioners to 
draw on IHRL principles and case law to ‘mainstream’ the protection of refugee and asylum-
seeking women. In this context, IHRL has been harnessed to emphasize the structural rather 
than simply individual nature of experiences of violence and persecution. In so doing, it has 
brought certain forms of harm against women, most notably rape and sexual violence into the 
mainstream, and challenging the violation of women’s rights in the so-called ‘private’ sphere. 
But whilst the question of whether women whose human rights are violated should be 
recognized as refugees under international refugee law might appear uncontroversial, these 
advances appear ‘nascent, contingent and fragile’.98 There continue to be multiple 
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impediments to the recognition of gender asylum claims, leading Millbank and Dauvergne to 
conclude that there is, at best, an ‘uneasy relationship’ between IRL and IHRL.99  
 
Some of the difficulties in bringing IHRL fully to bear are due to the narrow and increasingly 
restrictive application of IRL in the context of political and public concerns around migration 
and the growing emphasis on immigration controls. But they are also symptomatic of a more 
fundamental problem, namely, the ongoing failure of policy makers, lawyers and 
practitioners alike to fully comprehend the role of gender in shaping both women’s 
experiences of persecution and the (mis)interpretation of these experiences in the application 
of IRL.  
 
Many advocates and campaigners believe that they have made progress within IRL, in part 
through drawing on IHRL to make the case that women’s rights are human rights. Yet they 
have typically advanced what Otto describes as a conservative gender script that typecasts 
women – often alongside with children and in the context of ‘private’ familial relationships - 
as victims in need of protection.100 In so doing, they have both reflected and reinforced the 
sex / gender system which structures IHRL: 
 
Carving out territory for refugee women within mainstream legal realms has been 
one way that feminists have successfully redressed their invisibility within refugee 
discourse. To do so, however, they have been required to paint a monolithic 
picture of these legal subjects as passive, dependent, vulnerable victims in need of 
protection.101  
 
Despite (or perhaps because of) the stated objective of challenging stereotyped 
representations of women, this script gives disproportionate attention to certain kinds of 
harms, most notably sexual violence and ‘exotic harms’ such as FGM which provide an 
opportunity for refugee-receiving States to assert their credentials as defenders of women’s 
human rights often at the expense of recognising the politics of gendered power relations in 
countries of origin. The structural causes of women’s inequality and vulnerability to violence 
are not yet fully understood or reflected in IRL. Instead, women are predominantly 
conceptualized as apolitical subjects of male violence who must – under IRL as in life - rely 
upon the discretion of States to protect them.102 Thus, the space allocated to women within 
refugee rights discourse is both problematic and only marginally effective. Women continue 
to be seen as a deviation from the standard, as an exception to the rule, as somehow not quite 
fully human.  
 
Drawing on the important points made by Otto,103 it is clear that there is potential for IHRL 
to be brought positively to bear on IRL but that in order to so the feminist task of ensuring 
women’s access to rights mechanisms must be simultaneously accompanied by serious 
efforts to redefine them.104 Lawyers and practitioners will need to challenge - rather than rely 
upon - protective legal representations of women, focusing instead on the relational nature of 
rights and the context within which they are defined, together with the relations of power that 
determine who defines rights and has access to them in particular contexts.  
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In other words, what is required is a contextual analysis that includes gender, gender relations 
and gender equality and moves beyond discrete monolithic categories of ‘men’ and ‘women’ 
that flatten out the complexity and diversity of experience and depoliticize the specific 
circumstances under which violence and other threats to human security occur.105 Gender and 
gender relations need to be understood as fluid; variable and multiple rather than 
unchangeable, static and singular. This would act as an important counterbalance to the 
dominant discourse of the Refugee Woman and open up new opportunities to protect women 
(and men), whilst avoiding the essentialising and depoliticising discourse that dominates so 
much of contemporary policy and practice.  
  
                                                          
105 Crawley 2001, Edwards 2010 (n2). 
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